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What the Seller Won’t Tell You:  






Imagine that you are considering an investment in a new public offering of a 
firm’s shares. The firm’s officers have visited your city to make a presentation which 
included an audited financial statement, an earnings forecast was reviewed by its 
prestigious investment bankers, and an impressive demonstration of it new technology. 
Should such a presentation convince you to invest? How concerned should you be if no 
mention was made about a rumored competitor with a different technology? An 
economist reflecting on these same questions from the standpoint of policy might 
wonder: Does the firm’s need to convince naturally skeptical investors provide sufficient 
incentives for it to disclose accurate information in the right form and amounts? Could 
regulations mandating disclosure sometimes improve the quality of investment decisions? 
What kinds of regulations are likely to be most helpful, and when?  
It is not only in the investment sphere that buyers rely on sellers to supply 
information. For example, suppose that you are buying a new furnace to replace an old 
one that is not working well. The salesman displays a chart showing that the projected 
total life-cycle cost of one particular furnace, including capital costs and fuel usage over 
the lifetime of the furnace, is lower than for competing models you have considered. 
Should you worry about what the salesman is not telling you? Might it be that fuel usage 
costs are less important for an especially well insulated home like yours? What other 
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issues didn’t the salesman mention that could be relevant to your decision? If you talk to 
several sellers before buying, can you count on competition among them to bring out all 
the information you need to make a good decision? How does competition compare to 
regulation as a mechanism for encouraging sellers to provide valuable information to 
buyers?  
Modern economics textbooks emphasize that the problem of adverse selection can 
alter the operation of markets in fundamental ways, but little attention has yet been paid 
to seller’s efforts to mitigate that problem. Certainly, sellers of good quality products 
have a powerful incentive to eliminate adverse selection in order to increase sales. In 
modern capitalist economies, sellers routinely supply helpful information about their 
products, sometimes including test results and technical reports. Seller reputations play a 
role in encouraging honest reporting. In addition, private sector institutions including 
accounting firms, investment bankers, testing laboratories, hobbyist magazines, and 
others whose revenue-streams depend on their reputations may provide additional 
information or evaluate the accuracy of sellers’ claims. Public sector institutions also 
have a role: liability rules and laws against fraud help to ensure that reported information 
is accurate.  
Our purpose in this paper is to study how effectively these institutions mitigate 
adverse selection. How well does a system of private reporting work? When should we 
expect all the relevant information to be reported? If testing and reporting are costly, will 
too little testing and reporting be done? Or too much? When some information is 
withheld, what sort of information is that? How do rational buyers respond to such 
withholding? How are prices and welfare affected? What role is there for laws and   3
regulations to improve the functioning of markets? We answer some of these questions 
by studying the theory of persuasion games—games in which one or more players 
provides verifiable information to others in order to influence the actions they take.
2  
Two themes recur throughout our analyses. First, sophisticated buyers (those who 
play equilibrium strategies of the persuasion game) are consistently skeptical. When 
evidence is missing, they view that suspiciously, considering that any missing evidence is 
likely to be unfavorable to the seller and reduce their purchases accordingly.
3 The 
magnitude of this effect depends on what buyers believe about the seller’s ability to 
obtain and communicate the missing information. Second, the combination of consumer 
skepticism and the seller’s ability to reveal information selectively provides a powerful 
incentive for sellers of all but the worst products to acquire and report information. In the 
simplest models, this incentive completely solves the adverse selection problem. In 
equilibrium, sellers voluntarily reveal enough information that sophisticated buyers are 
able to make the same decisions as if they were fully informed. While empirical evidence 
about reporting policies is meager, there is one study showing that more frequent issuers 
of securities engage in more disclosure, which is consistent with the idea that sellers have 
an extra incentive to supply information.
4 
Does the seller have sufficient incentive to verify its product quality when testing 
is costly? Jovanovic (1982) finds that, at least sometimes, the answer is surprising: the 
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seller’s incentive to test its product is greater than in any efficient arrangement. To 
understand this conclusion, fix the buyer’s beliefs and strategy for the buyer and consider 
the seller’s decision about whether to conduct n or n+1 tests. If the buyer does not know 
the number of tests run, then the seller can report selectively. If the seller conducts the 
n+1
st  test and its result is positive, the seller can report that favorable result and charge a 
higher price. If the result is negative, the seller can withhold that. Since the buyer cannot 
distinguish that from the situation in which the seller had conducted just n tests, the seller 
can charge the same price in that case as if it had not performed the extra test. So, 
regardless of the buyer’s beliefs, additional testing combined with selective reporting 
raises the average price, causing a positive transfer on average from the buyer to the 
seller. That encourages excessive testing. In equilibrium, the sophisticated buyer 
understands the seller’s testing incentives and makes the correct assessments on average, 
but this negative pecuniary externality generally precludes an equilibrium with an 
efficient amount of testing.  
The problem of selective reporting and its damaging welfare consequences is 
familiar from news reports. Some of the most striking examples are drawn from the 
pharmaceutical industry. In one case, Merck’s arthritis drug, Vioxx, was found to double 
the risk of heart attacks for its users, but although this dangerous side effect was 
suspected by scientists for years before the drug was banned, there were no full studies 
confirming that danger and no reports alerting users to the risks. The Vioxx case, 
particularly the fact that the risks became apparent only after the drug had received FDA 
approval, has motivated recent policy proposals to change testing and reporting   5
requirements for approved drugs.
5 The Vioxx case is hardly unique. In another recent 
case, Eli Lilly instructed its salespeople to downplay the risks associated with its 
schizophrenia drug, Zyprexa, although the effects were severe.
6 
According to some simple theoretical models, if government could impose a 
requirement of mandatory disclosure preventing the seller from withholding negative test 
results, then the testing externality would be eliminated and the seller would be led to do 
an optimal amount of testing. That conclusion, however, does not survive closer scrutiny.  
To evaluate policy interventions, it is helpful to have a theory that is consistent 
with these pharmaceutical examples, and indeed such a theory has been developed. In the 
theory, the seller may have no verifiable test results to report, but may nevertheless be 
aware of indications of trouble. The seller decides whether to run certain tests. In the 
easiest version of the theory, the seller knows in advance what the outcome of any 
verifiable test will be. Then, there is an equilibrium in which sellers test and reveal “good 
news” and withhold “bad news” simply by not testing.
7 For such a strategy to mislead 
sophisticated buyers, they must be uncertain about which tests can or should be 
performed. When detailed information is missing, buyers then need to weigh two or more 
possibilities: either the seller is withholding bad news, or the seller is uninformed, or 
perhaps testing and reporting are too costly to be worthwhile. With these effects 
confounding the reporting decision, missing information causes sophisticated buyers to 
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reduce their purchases, but not as much as it would if they were to learn bad news about 
the product. So, it pays the seller to refrain from conducting and reporting verifiable tests.  
These same ideas have application that extend far beyond the pharmaceutical 
industry. As a second example, suppose that a firm planning a public offering has 
disgruntled employees who could file an employment discrimination lawsuit. It hardly 
pays for such a firm to track down the details of that threat, because any news it turns up 
would most likely discourage investors and reduce its share price. Without a proper legal 
or institutional framework, market forces alone do not solve the reporting problem.  
Legal rules may help. For example, the problem just described would be mitigated 
by a rule that holds the firm accountable for any unreported information if it should have 
known that information. In terms of a formal model, “should have known” means that the 
firm could have run that test at a reasonable cost. In the model, a well-informed firm 
would have run the test but for its private information that led it to believe that the test 
result would be unfavorable. Even if the private information is never observed by others, 
it is a fair inference after the fact that when a firm decides not to conduct an important, 
inexpensive test and the outcome proves to be unfavorable, that points to the firm having 
had negative information to underpin its decision. In practice, the “should have known” 
standard might be replaced by an obligation for management to investigate certain 
categories of threats, where the ratio of threat cost to evaluation cost is especially high.  
Private sector institutions can sometimes address the same sort of issue without 
the need for potentially politicized regulations. For example, an investment banker may 
be responsible for doing a thorough investigation of threats to the share value in 
anticipation of a public offering. For this to be effective, however, the investment banker   7
would need ex ante access to the same sorts of information that the court needs only ex 
post. For example, an investment banker may fail to observe that there is a cheap test to 
evaluate each of several threats, while the court only needs to pinpoint the threat for 
which a negative result occurred, which can make ex post verification cheaper and more 
effective.  
High quality sellers benefit when they can credibly make denials even when there 
is no possibility of verifiable information. For example, a firm issuing shares that has no 
major pending lawsuits against it benefits if it can claim that without being grouped with 
others firms who merely claim that there is no verifiable information about pending 
lawsuits. Accurate reporting can be helped by laws or regulations that mandate 
disclosures of material negative events that management either knows about, or should 
have known about. More empirical evidence about the role of laws and regulations 
mandating disclosure is needed to supplement the general empirical observation that 
some disclosure regulations do benefit stock markets.
8  
Another interesting variation on persuasion games arises in cases like the furnace-
buying example, in which the buyer is so poorly informed about a product that she is not 
sure which factors are most relevant to her decision. In a monopoly situation, such a 
buyer is at the mercy of unscrupulous sellers, but the situation is different when there are 
competing providers of information.
9 The furnace buyer, for example, may be unaware 
that it is important to check how well the new furnace will work well with 
complementary products, such as an existing system of hot air ducts or an existing 
chimney or cooling system. Information of this kind can often be elicited if the buyer 
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inspires competition among sellers, because each will be motivated to explain why its 
furnace will work better than the competitor’s in the buyer’s home. Competition in 
providing information, however, also has its limits. Self-interested furnace sellers would 
all omit telling the buyer if her problem can be solved most cheaply and effectively 
simply by adding insulation below the roof rather than by buying any new furnace.  
The remainder of this paper reviews these main theoretical points in more detail.  
Skepticism and Unraveling  
The simplest persuasion game has two players: an informed seller and a risk-
neutral uninformed buyer. The seller has private information about a variable θ , which 
we usually interpret as the one-dimensional quality of its product. We assume that there 
are N possible qualities  1 ... θ θ << N  listed in a set  { } 1,..., θ θ Θ= N . The seller’s only move 
in the game is to make a report S that the uninformed buyer considers in making its 
purchase decision. Although we will allow the report to be quite abstract, for most of our 
applications, it is sufficient to think of the report as naming a subset of Θ and thus 
directly restricting the possible qualities of the good.  
The buyer’s decision, q, is a scalar that we will usually interpret as the quantity 
the buyer purchases. Before hearing the seller’s report, the buyer believes that the 
probability of any particular quality level θi  is  0 π > i .  
Fixing the product price p, if the buyer purchases quantity q, her payoff is 
(,) θ − vq p q  and the seller’s payoff is () γ − p q for some unit cost  (0, ) γ ∈ p . Let  i q    9
denote the quantity that maximizes the buyer’s payoff in state θi .  (If there are multiple 
such quantities, take  i q  to be the largest one.)  
Often, we think of quality as raising the marginal value of consumption, but that 
need not be the case. For example, if higher quality light bulbs use less power and last 
longer, then the marginal value associated with bulbs bought to replace less power 
efficient bulbs rises as quality improves, but the marginal value of bulbs bought for 
inventory, to be used as replacements as bulbs burn out, declines. Over the long term, the 
higher quality, longer lasting bulbs likely lead to reduced purchases at any given price. 
This discussion illustrates that the relationship between quality and demand need not be a 
simple one.  
To avoid such complexities, our basic assumption throughout most of this paper is 
the following: 
Assumption A1. Quality increases marginal values: 
2 /0 θ θ ≡ ∂∂ ∂ > q vv q . 
Unfortunately, this assumption can obfuscate the discussion somewhat and is 
actually a bit more than is needed for the results of this section so, for now, we replace A1 
with two of its useful implications, which we treat as assumptions in their own right. The 
first is that the optimal quantities are ordered in the same way as the quality index:
 10  
Assumption A1(a):  1 ... ≤≤ N qq .  
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The second requires some notation to state precisely. Given beliefs π about the 
quality, the buyer’s optimal quantity is  () q π , which solves max ( , ) qj j j vq p q πθ − ∑ .
11 
Then, another implication of A1 is that uncertainty about the quality leads the buyer to 
compromise, picking some quantity between the optimal amounts called for at the 
extreme qualities:  
Assumption A1(b): Suppose that there exist θ j and θk  such that  () ,()0 π θπ θ> kj  
and  ≠ kj qq . Then, min{ | ( ) 0} π θ > ii q () π < < q max{ | ( ) 0} π θ > ii q .  
The “compromise” assumption is reasonable for many applications and can be 
derived from the  0 θ > q v  condition, but there are plausible situations in which it could 
fail. For example, suppose that θ  presents information about about driving conditions 
and q is the type of motor oil used, arranged from least expensive to most expensive. Let 
q1 and q2 be different grades of oil that are best for different driving conditions, 
designated by the two states  { } 12 , θ θ Θ= . Only the seller knows the actual driving 
conditions and consequently which choice of q is most suitable for the buyer. Quality q3 
corresponds to a synthetic motor oil that is more profitable for the seller and is effective 
for all driving conditions. If the buyer is left uninformed about driving conditions, she 
might find it optimal to buy the most expensive grade, q3, which is outside the range 
12 {, } qq . If silence by the seller is feasible, then there is be an equilibrium of the 
persuasion game in which the seller is always silent and the buyer always purchases q3. 
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Assumption A1(b) rules out this example, because it makes it impossible that silence will 
lead to a choice  31 2 max{ , } qq q > .  
So far, we have focused on describing the buyer’s full-information preferences. 
By assumption, however, the buyer is not fully informed about the state and instead relies 
on the seller for information. When the state is θ, the seller makes some verifiable 
statement S about θ . The report must be must be feasible given the actual quality, which 
we take to mean that S must be chosen from  ( ) θ Ω ; the set of feasible reports in each state 
as determined by Ω is a parameter of the model. In the example where the seller reports a 
subset of S ⊂Θ, the restriction can be written as  S θ ∈ .
12  The key assumption of this 
section is that it is always possible for a seller to make some verifiable report that 
distinguishes its quality from lower qualities.  
Assumption A2.  When the actual state is θ, the seller has available a report S that 
rules out lower quality types. In symbols: ( )( ( ))( )[ ( )] θ θθ θ θ ′′ ∀ ∃∈ Ω ∀ < ∉ Ω SS .  
This assumption would be satisfied, for example, if the seller could always prove 
the precise quality of its product or if it can prove a tight lower bound on the quality of its 
product.
13  
The combination of assumptions A1(a&b) and A2 enables a thorough-going 
skepticism on the part of the buyer. If the seller chooses not to reveal the detailed state 
and the buyer knows that it could do so, then the buyer can react by extremely cautious in 
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deciding what to purchase, buying only the minimum proven quantity. We will show 
below that this is indeed what must happen in equilibrium..  
To state that conclusion formally, let 
*() i S  be the seller’s reporting strategy in 
some equilibrium, so 
*() θ S is what the seller reports when the true state is θ. Similarly, 
let 
*() i q  be the buyer’s purchasing strategy, so 
*() qSis quantity that the buyer purchases 
when the seller reports S. Finally, let 
* πS  be the buyer’s probability distribution over Θ 
after hearing the report S.  
Definition. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hereafter, simply an equilibrium) is a 
triple 
*** (,,) π Sq  satisfying three conditions: 
1.  The seller always reports to maximize its net profits. In symbols: for all θ ∈Θ, 
**
() () a r g m a x ( ) () S Sp q S θ θγ ∈Ω ∈− . 
2.  The buyer maximizes its payoffs, given its beliefs. In symbols, 
** () ( ) S qS q π = .  
3.  The buyer’s beliefs are consistent with the restrictions implied by the sellers’ 
verifiable reports and with Bayes’ theorem as applied to the seller’s reporting 
strategy. In symbols, this implies two restrictions:
14 
a. 
*() 0 πθ= S  for  ( ) θ ∉Ω S  
b.  For all S in the range of 
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Proposition 1. In the persuasion game described above, suppose the three 
assumptions A1(a&b) and A2 hold. Then, the following statements hold.  
1.  The buyer has a unique equilibrium buying strategy:  { }
*() m i n | () θ =∈ Ω ii qS qS .  
2.  The buyer has a unique equilibrium belief—the skeptical belief—according to 
which 
*()1 πθ= Si  for  { } min | ( ) θ =∈ Ω j ij S . 
3.  The seller has many equilibrium reporting strategies S
*. A strategy is an 
equilibrium reporting strategy if and only if it has the property that 
{ }
* min | ( ) ( ) θθ ∈Ω = ij j Si  for all  1,..., iS = .. 
4.  In every equilibrium, the outcome is the same as the full information outcome: 
()
** () θ = ii qS q .  
The first statement of the proposition captures the main essence of the result. 
When the buyer hears a report the essence of which is that “the product quality might be 
θi , which justifies a purchase of  i q , or it might be some state that justifies a higher 
purchase,” the buyer purchases only  i q  and never a greater quantity.  
The second statement of the proposition indicates why that is the buyer’s optimal 
response, namely, the report convinces her that the state really is θi . If it were otherwise, 
then the seller would have said so. The buyer’s extreme skepticism is a necessary 
property of equilibrium in this persuasion game.  
The third statement asserts that when the state is actually θi , the seller provides 
information indicating that the state index is at least that high and possibly higher. That   14
distinguishes the seller from lower quality types. The ambiguity doesn’t fool the buyer, 
but it doesn’t hurt, either.  
Finally, the outcome of this persuasion game is a happy one: the buyer purchases 
just as she would if she were fully informed. If things were as simple as this, there would 
be no distortions and no use for regulations to govern the transaction and the release of 
information.  
The argument used to prove Proposition 1 is commonly called the unraveling 
argument. The usual presentation is by mathematical induction, showing that the highest 
quality types always make reports that distinguish themselves and proceeding downward 
to lower quality types. The idea is that assumption A2 ensures that each quality type can 
distinguish itself and assumption A1(a&b) assures that the highest quality types benefit 
by distinguishing themselves. That argument establishes statement 4 of the proposition 
and the rest then follow in short order.  
To state the argument precisely, let us first argue that for any quality type θi, the 
equilibrium sales must always be exactly qi. Indeed, by assumption A2, the seller has a 
strategy that ensures the sales are at least qi, so sales cannot be lower than that in any 
equilibrium. Also, in equilibrium, the buyer interprets information accurately, so if there 
is any quality type θi  for which equilibrium sales are not  i q , then the equilibrium report 
*() θ = i SS  must also be made by at least one other quality type besides θi . Let θ j be the 
highest quality type that makes the report S; then, 
*() θ = j SS . By assumption A1(b), the 
sales when the report is S must be strictly less than  j q , which implies that the seller is not 
maximizing sales when its quality type is θ j, contrary to the equilibrium condition.   15
Hence, sales must coincide with the full-information buyer decision, proving statement 4 
of the proposition. 
Assumption A1(b) and the definition of equilibrium imply that 
*() ≥ qS  
{ } min | ( ) θ ∈Ω ii qS . Suppose, contrary to statement 1, that 
*() > qS { } min | ( ) θ ∈Ω ii qS  
= j q  for some θ j with  ( ) θ ∈Ω j S . Then, a seller of quality type is θ j can sell more than 
j q  by reporting S and so must sell more in equilibrium. This contradicts statement 4 of 
the proposition, which we have already proved. Hence, statement 1 is also proved.  
Statement 2 is the heart of the proposition. Since equilibrium beliefs must respect 
reporting feasibility, the buyer can assign positive probability only to quality types at 
least as high as  { } min | ( ) θ =∈ Ω j ij S . Suppose, contrary to statement 2, that the buyer 
assigns strictly positive probability to any strict higher quality types. Then by assumption 
A1(b), the buyer will purchase a quantity 
* () π > Si qq . In that event, the seller with quality 
θi  could sell more than  i q  by reporting S, contrary to the proven statement 4.  
Finally, statement 3 of the proposition characterizes the seller’s possible 
equilibrium reports for each quality type as any reports that could not also be made by 
lower quality types. To see that is a necessary property of an equilibrium strategy, notice 
that if such mimicry by low quality types were possible, that would achieve sales for 
those types exceeding the full-information quantity, contradicting statement 4. To see that 
the property is sufficient, we verify the equilibrium properties. The buyer must be 
optimizing, because she achieves her full information decisions for every quality type. 
Given the buyer’s skeptical posture, no quality type of the seller can achieve higher sales.   16
Finally, it is routine to check that the buyer’s beliefs satisfy their two equilibrium 
conditions.  
How Uncertainty Mutes Skepticism 
When we introduce uncertainty about the seller’s information, parts of the 
analysis change. The buyer still casts a skeptical eye on missing information, but her 
skepticism is muted because she is unsure about what information the seller could have 
reported. In terms of the buyer’s purchase decision, this means that bad news is strictly 
worse than no news and leads to smaller quantity purchases. Understanding that, in 
equilibrium, the seller withholds bad news and reports only good news.  
To capture these ideas in a simple model, we adapt a model of Shin (2003), 
assuming that the quality of the good is multidimensional and represented by N 
characteristics.
15 We denote by  j x  the good’s score on characteristic j and by  1 χ = i  and 
0 χ = i  the events that the test of good j is verifiable to the buyer. The entire vector 
11 ( ,..., , ,..., ) NN xx χ χ  is the seller’s private information so a priori the buyer knows 
neither the realization of any test nor even whether there is a verifiable test result that 
could be reported.  
In this model, a feasible report  1 ( ,..., ) ∈Ω n Sx x  is a list of true statements 
reporting the product’s score on some of the characteristics. To permit closed form 
solutions, let us suppose that the quality of the good is summarized by a scalar: 
1 ... n x x θ =++ and that the buyer’s value is  ( ) vq θ . Equilibrium is defined as above.  
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For our analysis in this section, we replace assumptions A1(a&b) by the stronger 
assumption A1. We replace A2, which restrict what the seller can verify, by the weaker 
assumption A3, which permits both that some characteristics may be unverifiable and 
that the buyer may be unable to identify those.  
Assumption A3. The 2N random variables  11 ,..., , ,..., χ χ NN xx  are statistically 
independent. For each j,  j x  is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and the probability  
that  j x  is verifiable is  { } Pr 1 χ π = = jv . The seller observes the realizations of 
these variables but the buyer does not.  
Proposition 2. Assume A1 and A3. Then there is a unique equilibrium 
*** (,,) Sqπ  
of the persuasion game with the property that the buyer’s assessment of each  j x  depends 
only on the report about  j x . Let  ( ) 1( 1 ) / vv v x π ππ =− − − . Then, in this equilibrium,  
1.  According to S
*, the seller reports the outcome of a test j if and only if 
1 χ = j  and  > jj x x .  
2.  Given any report S, the buyer’s posterior belief is 
*
S π , according to which 
the various test results are statistically independent and have the following 
probabilities 
a.  If the seller reports that  α = j x , then  { } ( )
* 1 Sj x πα = = .  




* / (1 )(1 )                                  for 
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3.  The buyer purchases the quantity 
*() ( ) S qS q π = .  
The key to interpreting of Proposition 2 lies in the buyer’s beliefs when no 
verifiable test result is reported for test j. The formula is simply a conditional probability 
calculation. In the numerator is the joint probability that the true test value is less than α 
and no report is made. In the denominator is the probability of the event that no report is 
made. For low values of α, the joint probability is the same as the probability that the test 
value is less than α. For high values of α, it is the probability that the test value is too low 
to lead to a report plus the probability that the test value is high enough, but still less than 
α and that no verifiable report is possible.  
Unlike our first model, this one leaves a potential role for liability rules or direct 
regulation, because firms do sometimes withhold information. For suppose a court or 
regulator could determine after the fact that a firm withheld negative information and 
could impose liability for any losses. Then, more complete information would be 
revealed to the buyer, improving buyer decision making.  
The model of this section, however, is still too thin to enable actual welfare 
analyses. It omits the seller’s decision about whether to test at all, which our motivating 
examples suggest is an important part of the story. To focus attention on that, we 
specialize the model and add more detail about the buyer’s and seller’s payoff. This 
enables a meaningful welfare analysis and also allows us to begin our examination of the 
seller’s incentive to perform verifiable tests which might mitigate the problem of adverse 
selection.   19
The Seller’s Incentive to Disclose  
Consider next an extended persuasion game in which, in addition to making a 
report S, the seller also sets the price p of its product. Suppose that the buyer is making a 
yes-or-no decision to buy a fixed number of units of the product; for example, the number 
of new furnaces she will buy is either zero or one. Using the notation of the preceding 
section,  () θ v  is the consumer’s full-information reservation price—the highest price she 
would pay for a unit of the good. In equilibrium, the seller can work out how its report S 
will affect the reservation price, so it sets the product price to  [() | ] θ = p Ev S  and extracts 
the whole surplus as its profit.  
Suppose now that reporting is costly, that is, the seller must incur a cost to make a 
verifiable test of attribute j. Intuitively, the seller’s incentive to test and reveal 
information is at least sometimes excessive. An extreme example illustrates the 
possibility and highlights some generalizable economics. Thus, suppose there is just one 
relevant product attribute ( 1 = N ) and that the product’s marginal cost is  0 γ = . Then, the 
buyer is willing to purchase at a price above cost even if no information is reported. A 
planner who can regulate the amount of verifiable testing but cannot regulate the product 
price would recognize that the value of information in this situation is zero, so it could 
achieve the total-surplus-maximizing outcome by proscribing all costly verifiable 
reporting. With such a regulation, the seller would set the price to  [() ] θ = pE v , which 
makes the buyer just willing to purchase the product, and total surplus would be 
maximized. In particular, no resources would be wasted on verifiable testing that affects 
the price but not the allocation of the product.    20
Despite the fact that costly testing can only reduce the total surplus in this 
example and that, at equilibrium, the consumer’s payoff cannot be negative, the seller 
cannot avoid doing some testing in equilibrium if the testing cost is sufficiently low. For 
suppose that the no testing outcome always occurs. Since the buyer would then expect no 
testing, the product price p would be set to  [ ] () θ Ev  and the seller would enjoy that entire 
amount as its producer surplus. When quality is sufficiently good (θ θ = N ) and testing is 
sufficiently cheap ( ( ) [ ( )] θ θ <− N cv E v ), the seller could then increase its net profit to 
() [ ( ) ] θ θ −> N vc E v  by testing, reporting, and raising its price to  ( ) θN v . That profitable 
deviation contradicts the possibility of an equilibrium with no testing.  
There are several suggestive points in this example, but let us state them for a 
situation in which an uninformed buyer would not want to buy at all. Throughout, we 
assume that testing is costly, so the planner’s optimum would involve less than complete 
revelation. In such a situation, the planner would want to reveal product information only 
when (1) trade actually adds positive value and (2) the amount of value added, which is 
() θ γ − v , exceeds the cost of testing. The planner would want the seller to use only the 
least costly verifiable test sufficient to cause the purchase to proceed.  
The seller’s incentives are partially aligned with that, but with two important 
differences. First, since the price-setting seller captures the whole surplus from any 
transaction (the buyer just breaks even), it prefers testing over no-testing whenever the 
planner does. The seller may also want to test, however, when the product is actually so 
bad that there are no net gains from trade but where there is enough favorable   21
information to convince the buyer anyway. So, the seller tests any time the planner would 
test, and other times, too.  
Second, for every level of quality, the seller will always want to spend at least as 
much on testing as the planner, and sometimes more. This is obvious for the case where 
the planner would prefer to do no testing. When the planner prefers some testing, it 
would like to do that in the least cost way which causes the transaction to proceed. The 
seller’s interests are different. Besides wanting the transaction to proceed, it wants also to 
get the highest possible price net of its costs and that generally calls for revealing 
different information than the planner would prefer. In many of our simple models, 
“different” translates into “more” because additional good news can only raise the price 
of the product.  
Both of these observations amount to saying that verifiable testing combined with 
selective reporting creates a pervasive negative externality in equilibrium. We have 
already described this externality in the introduction. Holding the buyer’s beliefs fixed, 
suppose the seller runs an additional test and reports its results selectively and compare 
that to the situation where no additional test is conducted. If the test result is good, that 
allows the seller to charge a higher price; if it is bad, the seller withholds the report and 
gets the same price as if no test had been run. Hence, with selective reporting, extra 
testing leads to higher average prices. Selective reporting thus leads to a negative 
pecuniary externality which encourages excessive testing.  
In equilibrium, buyers form their beliefs correctly, so the seller’s manipulations 
do not lead to systematically high prices and losses for the buyer. Instead, the equilibrium 
is a sort of rat race similar to that found by Akerlof (1976), in which the seller’s effort to   22
extract rents raises costs unnecessarily and causes a loss of value that the seller itself 
bears.  
Our findings are summarized in the first three points of the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. In equilibrium of the persuasion-and-pricing game,  
1.  Prices are set so that the buyer’s expect profit, conditional on its 
information, is always zero:  [ ] () | S p Ev S θ = .    
2.  For each level of quality, the seller spends as much or more on testing and 
verification as the amount that would be spent by a total-surplus-
maximizing planner.  
3.  Overspending on testing occurs whenever the product quality is 
sufficiently high and the cost of additional testing is sufficiently low.  
4.  If the cost of reporting each characteristic is  1
2 [0, ] ∈ c  and 
1 ()
N
j j vx θθ
= == ∑ , then the seller tests and reports characteristic j 
whenever 2 ≥ j x c and, given any set R of reported characteristics, the 
price charged is  ( ) ||
∈ +− ∑ j jRx NR c .  
Only the fourth point of the proposition has not yet been explained and it merely 
explains the seller’s and buyer’s strategies in a particularly simple special case. It is 
intuitive that, in equilibrium, the seller reports characteristic j whenever  j x  is sufficiently 
large, say  j x x ≥ . The buyer who sees no report about  j x  makes a correct inference and 
infers, based on the uniform distribution, that the expected value of the unreported   23
characteristic is  1
2 x , so the buyer will pay at most  ( ) 1
2 || j jRx NR x
∈ +− ∑  and the seller 
sets the price accordingly. Given the buyer’s strategy, the seller prefers to incur the cost 
c, report the true  j x , and be paid accordingly when  1
2 j x cx − ≥ . The value of  x  that 
renders the two inequalities identical is  2 x c = .  
The models underlying Propositions 2 and 3 assume that the seller is fully 
informed about its product. In that situation, if the product characteristics could be 
costlessly verified after consumption, then costly pre-sale verification would be 
unnecessary, because a liability rule that holds the seller responsible after-the-fact for any 
false statements would deter dissembling. That sort of ex post verification effectively 
returns us to the situation modeled in Proposition 1, in which buyer skepticism leads to 
full disclosure and there is no need for regulation.  
There are two reasons why, in practice, ex post verification of claims is unlikely 
to provide sufficient protection for buyers. One is asymmetric information. For example, 
a pharmaceutical company may be aware that patients using its new drug are 
experiencing poorer results than had been expected, but it may not yet have run tests or 
evaluated the clinical data to determine the nature or extent of the problem. Similarly, a 
firm issuing new shares may be aware of complaints about its employment or 
environmental policies, but it may not yet have evaluated what legal risks those policies 
create. In these situations, the seller arguably has no verifiable information that is 
governed by simple mandatory disclosure rules and it may fear that generating such 
information can only lead to negative results. Some valuable testing and disclosure would 
then be suppressed.    24
A second reason why ex post verification of claims may be insufficient to restore 
efficiency is that the buyer may not know what to ask or how to interpret the information 
she has. A seller of ceiling insulation may fail to report that the product contains asbestos 
or another dangerous chemical and the buyer, even if she has a sophisticated 
understanding of the strategic situation, may simply not have the product knowledge or 
scientific knowledge to know what information to expect, what questions to ask, or what 
to make of a report that a product does contain a certain chemical.  
When Revelation Should be Compelled 
Regulatory remedies for situations like those described above may need to be 
intrusive in markets or more difficult to administer than merely mandating reporting of 
known test results. For instance, in the pharmaceutical industry example, the seller uses 
its unverifiable private information to make decisions about which tests to perform. 
Regulation that tries to force testing ex ante falters on an information problem: if the 
regulator knew which of the missing tests to compel, then the buyer could equally well 
simply be skeptical about the absence of those tests. The alternative to compelling testing 
is to impose liability rules, but these must be different from the ones discussed above, 
because the problem is not one of false reporting. What is needed to restore incentives is 
to hold the seller liable for failures to reveal promptly not only the verifiable information 
that the seller knew but also the information that it should have known. This works better 
than compelling immediate disclosure if, eventually, accumulating evidence about a 
product defect comes to light and if discovery in a legal proceeding can then reveal when 
the seller became aware of a possible problem. In practice, such a system can work only   25
it is eventually possible to establish what the seller should have known and when it 
should have known it.  
The second example, in which consumers don’t know the relevant product 
science, has different potential remedies. The simplest solution, in principle, is for an 
industry regulator who is an expert in the subject matter to mandate the relevant material 
disclosures.
16 Such regulations are sometimes attempted. For example, there have long 
been regulations requiring life insurance companies that sell whole life insurance policies 
to forecast the policy’s cash value accumulations and net realized costs at various future 
dates, although these forecasts rely on many assumptions which are not guaranteed. As 
shown below, competition among sellers is sometimes a partial substitute for regulation 
in this kind of setting, because it can compel sellers to reveal sufficient information to 
enable buyers to make good decisions.  
Game theory, with its standard assumptions of rationality, does not yet have a 
really good way to accommodate models of buyers who are so unaware of relevant facts 
that they cannot even reason about them. The buyer who has never even heard of asbestos 
is different from a buyer who does not know that it is risky, but she cannot even ask a 
question about it. Nevertheless, some progress in modeling unaware consumers can be 
made by the following sort of model.  
Suppose that there are  2 ≥ N  product characteristics, but only one characteristic 
actually varies in quality. Instead of unawareness, we impose limits on communication of 
                                                 
16 Even here, ex post regulation has a role. Laws against fraud, implied warranties of merchantability or 
product fitness all aim to mitigate reporting and adverse selection problems.    26
technical information, so the seller can report test results about only a small number of 
characteristics, say just one.  
Although verifiable tests are available for every characteristic, the buyer’s utility 
from purchasing the product depends on only one of the characteristics. If the relevant 
characteristic is good (which occurs with probability π) or if the characteristic is not the 
relevant one, then its test result is 1. We assume that the seller can report any test value 
less than or equal to the actual test value.
17 If the relevant characteristic is bad (which has 
probability 1 – π), then its test result is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. The 
seller can verifiably report any value less than or equal to the test result. The game 
proceeds by the seller naming one characteristic and verifiably reporting its test result. 
Finally, we model the idea that the buyer is a “novice” by assuming that she does 
not know the names of any characteristics until the seller reports one, so she cannot 
determine whether the characteristic the seller reports about is the relevant characteristic 
or some other one.
18  
Proposition 4. In the persuasion game with a novice buyer, there is an equilibrium 
in which any report is about a test result of value 1, the buyer regards any report as 
uninformative and chooses q accordingly.  
If the buyer is informed enough to name some characteristics, then there is a 
better procedure which, in equilibrium, conveys some useful information. According to 
this procedure, the buyer asks the seller for information about some characteristic that 
                                                 
17 This “free disposal in reporting” is included so that a seller cannot establish the relevance of its test 
report merely by reporting a number less than 1—say 0.99, to establish that the relevant characteristic is 
actually quite good.  
18 This novice buyer model is adapted from Milgrom and Roberts (1986).    27
she, the buyer, can name. With probability 1/N, that is the relevant characteristic and, if 
the product is actually bad, the seller’s verifiable report (or the seller’s refusal to make 
any report) will establish that. If the seller responds with a good report, the buyer’s 
decision can also account probabilistically for the information that such a report conveys.  
The persuasion game with a novice buyer (or an “unaware” buyer) creates the 
possibility that an expert regulator could, by requiring product labeling for relevant 
characteristics, encourage more useful and informative disclosures. Labeling emerge as 
remedies in our analysis when consumers are novices, that is, so unfamiliar with the 
product that they don’t know what to ask about, and when all consumers have the same 
concerns. With too much consumer heterogeneity, the labeling solution fails, because the 
regulator does not know which characteristic needs to be reported. Mandating full 
reporting fails because the buyer has limited information processing capacity.  
Another solution that could, in principle, restore efficient arises when there are 
some agreed product standards, the seller is required to disclose product defects, and 
there is ex post liability for failures to disclose. Consumer heterogeneity, however, is 
again a problem, particularly if the buyer’s characteristics can change over time. In such 
cases, it may be difficult to verify whether the seller had reported the right information 
for the particular buyer. Reporting too much information in this situation leads to 
information overload, in which the buyer may fail to notice the most relevant 
information.  
Regulation or Competition? 
Our example of the furnace purchase is typical of ones in which buyers may differ 
in their relevant characteristics, because the optimal furnace depends on other   28
characteristics of the buyer’s home. The size of the home, the capacity of hot air ducts, 
the amount of insulation, the construction of the chimney, and other factors can all be 
things about which a buyer might need to be informed. If a regulator can select just one, 
which one should it be? Surely, it is better to have an expert seller be motivated to report 
the relevant characteristic. When can competition among sellers create such an incentive? 
Not always. For example, it may be that no furnace seller will report to the buyer 
that her best choice is to repair the old furnace or install better insulation, or for a tobacco 
company to report that all tobacco products can cause cancer and lung disease. However, 
if we set the more limited objective of having the buyer make the best choice from among 
the sellers’ offerings and if each seller offers only a single product (or if the product price 
is endogenous), then sellers with the best offerings will be motivated to point out the 
characteristics that most distinguish their own products. Competition can lead to useful 
disclosures, if not complete ones, even to novice buyers.  
To study this sort of competition in a formal model, we modify the novice buyer 
model of the preceding section. Suppose there are two sellers, both of which are perfectly 
informed about the relevant product characteristics and about how each product scores on 
that characteristic. Each seller names a characteristic, which we interpret as the claim that 
it is the relevant one. The buyer then identifies a characteristic that one of the sellers has 
named. We interpret this as a request that both sellers report about that characteristic. 
Each seller may then make a verifiable report about the identified characteristic or about 
the one they have named. Finally, the sellers quote prices for their products and the buyer 
chooses one or neither. For simplicity, the sellers’ supply cost for the product is zero.    29
Because the buyer’s announcement is pure cheap talk, this game necessarily has 
multiple equilibria. One that is most consistent with our interpretation of the moves is as 
follows.  
Proposition 5. The following is an equilibrium of the persuasion game with 
competing sellers and a novice buyer.  
1.  If a seller has a better test report for the relevant characteristic than the 
other seller, then it names the relevant characteristic to the buyer at the 
first round of the game. Otherwise, the seller names any characteristic on 
which it gets a perfect test report (test value = 1). 
2.  The buyer randomizes and selects one of the two named characteristics, 
each with equal probability.  
3.  The sellers each report their test result on the buyer’s named characteristic. 
Each seller also names its corresponding Bertrand equilibrium price for 
the subgame, given the buyer’s information.  
4.  The buyer beliefs are formed as follows. If a seller reports the test result 
for the buyer-identified characteristic, then the buyer believes that report is 
equal to the test result. If a seller fails to name the required characteristic, 
then the buyer infers that its test result for the buyer-identified 
characteristic is zero.  
5.  Given its beliefs, the buyer determines its values for the two products. It 
buys the product for which value minus price is greatest. In the event of a 
tie, if one product has a higher quality than the other, then the buyer   30
purchases the higher quality product, and otherwise it selects one of the 
two products at random.  
In this equilibrium, the buyer gets some information from competition among the 
sellers. The seller with the better quality product names the relevant characteristic in 
order to win the sale, even if that depresses its price somewhat. Compared to the 
regulatory solution, if the relevant characteristic can vary among buyers, competition can 
lead to more relevant and valuable reporting. In a variation of the model where the buyer 
can ask about both characteristics, the full-information efficient outcome results. 
Generally, however, so long as the buyer capacity to process information is limited 
relative to the amount of information reported, some inefficiency of decisions is to be 
expected.  
Conclusion 
When buyers are sophisticated, markets provide powerful incentives for sellers to 
provide verifiable product information. This can sometimes go a long way toward 
alleviating problems of adverse selection. Yet, sellers may still have an incentive to test 
selectively, based on their unverifiable suspicions about which tests will make their 
products look good. Regulation, especially in the form creating liability for withholding 
material information, can help to mitigate the costs of non-disclosure.  
The problem becomes harder when buyers are novices, that is, when they are 
unsure about which product characteristics are relevant to them and when complete 
information about the product is just too complex and detailed for the buyer to analyze. If 
buyers are not too heterogeneous, this can sometimes be solved by expert regulators who 
mandate disclosure of the most significant product characteristics, but that can become   31
too difficult when buyer heterogeneity causes the number of potentially significant 
characteristics to multiply. Competition among sellers helps somewhat, because sellers 
will be led to emphasize the important characteristics on which their own products have 
an advantage. If, however, the best decision for a buyer lies outside the set offered by the 
sellers, then no seller will have an incentive to reveal this fact.  
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